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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last 10-15 years, a very large amount of attention has been given to the role 
of institutions in economic growth.  This has, in large part, been driven by economic 
policy priorities such as how to develop effectively functioning market economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union post-1989; and how to foster 
economic growth in lagging world regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa.  In parallel, 
and partly in response, there have been major explorations of the role of institutions in 
the functioning of market economies both by economists (e.g. the literature arising out 
of Williamson’s transaction cost economics approach) and by economic historians 
(e.g. North (1990) and others).   
 
In recent years, there has also been a substantial empirical literature on the relative 
roles of institutions, policy, geography and trade openness on growth performance 
across countries.  This literature currently indicates that institutional quality is the 
dominant determinant of variations in long-term growth performance1.  Good 
institutions embody a heritage of past good policy decisions and themselves generate 
a flow of superior policy decisions that support sustained investment and productivity 
growth2.  In his recent survey on growth strategies, Rodrik (2003) argues that, 
although it is quite possible to achieve short-term growth accelerations (e.g. of 10 
years or more) with very limited institutional change; the main requirement to ensure 
sustained growth and convergence with the living standards in advanced countries “… 
is the acquisition of high quality institutions”. In particular, he argues that there is a 
requirement for a “… cumulative process of institution building to ensure that growth 
does not run out of steam and that the economy remains resilient to shocks” 3.   
 
Infrastructure industries are not just a microcosm of the aggregate economy.  The 
arguments above on aggregate growth apply with extra force to utility service 
industries.  This is because not just are they highly capital intensive, but, in addition, 
because most of their assets are very long-lived and (in economic terms) sunk assets.  
Hence, an effective institutional framework is essential to sustain growth in output, 
efficiency and capacity for commercialised utility service industries such as 
electricity, telecommunications, water and similar - particularly if these industries 
have significant amounts of private investment (physical and/or financial).   
 
                                                 
We are grateful for helpful comments on this paper from seminar participants at the University 
of Cambridge and at City University.  We would particularly like to thank Dimitrios Asteriou 
for helpful discussions, Peter Burridge for econometric advice and Evens Salies for initial 
assistance with the data collection. We would also like to acknowledge financial support from 
the World Bank.  The authors alone are, however, solely responsible for the analysis and the 
views expressed for which none of the above take any responsibility and which should not be 
attributed to the World Bank nor to any of its staff or members. 
 
1  See Rodrik , Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) for a recent survey of the literature on studies of 
cross-country growth performance. 
2  Rodrik et al (2002), pp 20-21.  
3  Rodrik (2003), p.25 
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The standard institutional solution is to introduce an independent regulatory agency, 
operating within a clearly defined legal framework4.  The regulatory agency is 
intended to provide the “high quality institution” which permits and fosters sustained 
growth in capacity and efficiency in the utility service industries – particularly the 
network elements.  Hence, whether or not country X has a high or a low quality 
institution is determined primarily by the quality of governance of the regulatory 
agency.  As with the aggregate economy, developing countries with high quality 
regulatory agencies (as measured by their regulatory governance) should attract more 
investment on a sustained basis into their utility service industries and at a lower cost 
of capital, as well as having higher efficiency levels and growth rates.   
 
We would expect this outcome to arise because regulatory agencies with better 
governance should  (a) make fewer mistakes and (b) have their mistakes identified 
and rectified better and more quickly so that (c) good regulatory practice is more 
readily established and maintained.  It may well be possible to obtain a major short-to-
medium term increase in investment without an effective regulatory framework, but 
the considerations outlined above suggest that this will not be sustained long-term.  
The collapse of the Asian IPP boom of the early 1990s and the late 1990s difficulties 
with many of the Latin American infrastructure reforms and concession contracts 
provide some evidence to support this conjecture.  
 
The perspective outlined above is at the heart of the recent literature on regulatory 
governance for utility service industries, particularly the literature that focuses on 
developing and transition economies.  This perspective is set out in Levy and Spiller 
(1994) – which draws explicitly on North (1990) – as well as in a number of 
subsequent papers5. However, until recently, there has been very little systematic 
empirical testing of the hypothesis that better regulatory governance (a) reduces 
unserved demand by encouraging investment or (b) increases efficiency.  There have 
been many case studies – and these can be very illuminating but do not allow reliable 
generalisations – but, until the last 2-3 years, little formal econometric or other 
statistical testing.   
 
This is now changing.  More developing country utility regulators have been in place 
for 5 years or more and data is now becoming available on them that can be related to 
industry outcomes on a comparable basis, most obviously for telecoms.  Hence, there 
have been a number of studies of the impact of a regulatory agency on capacity 
growth and efficiency in telecoms.  All the major recent studies show that having a 
regulatory agency is significantly associated, either directly or indirectly, with higher 
mainline capacity per capita and higher labour productivity.   
 
                                                 
4  An independent regulatory agency is not the only way of providing the necessary institutional 
support either in theory or in practice.  In addition, an independent regulator may be combined 
with a high or a low degree of reliance on contracts and courts.   
There is a major issue of whether or not low income developing countries have the human and 
other resources to sustain independent regulatory agencies, particularly regulatory agencies 
with a significant degree of discretion.  Nevertheless, an independent regulatory agency has 
become the standard solution to the private investment problem for utilities in the same way as 
an independent central bank has become the standard solution to handle commitment and time 
inconsistency problems in monetary policy.  See Section 2 below as well as the literature 
discussed in Stern and Cubbin (2003). 
5  See, inter alia, Smith (1997), Stern and Holder (1999), Noll (2001).  
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In this paper, we carry out a similar exercise for electricity supply industries in 
developing countries.  Specifically, we provide an econometric analysis of the 
relationship between the quality of regulatory governance and (a) the level of 
generation capacity per capita and (b) some efficiency measures for a sample of 28 
Latin American, Caribbean, Asian and African countries over the period 1980-2001. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss the underlying economic 
issues and the main institutional design considerations.  This includes a summary 
review of recent relevant literature and its relevance for our analysis.  In Section 3, we 
set out our modelling approach, including the modelling objectives, our econometric 
approach, data issues and potential econometric concerns.  Section 4 presents the 
estimation results.  Section 5 discusses the results and their implications as well as 
providing some short concluding comments. 
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2. Underlying Economic Issues, Institutional Design and Implications 
for Empirical Analysis 
 
The main issue on which we focus is the inability of governments to make credible 
and binding commitments about utility pricing to sustain private investment while 
retaining decision-making powers over these issues.   
 
The discussion of utility service regulation concentrates on commercialised utilities 
facing genuine budget constraints, particularly where private investment and/or 
private finance is important.  The focus of the discussion (and of our empirical work) 
is on regulatory governance (e.g. autonomy, accountability, etc) rather than on 
regulatory content (e.g. methods of price, investment and related aspects of 
regulation)6.  
 
2.1 Time Inconsistency Problems for Monetary Policy and for Utility Service 
Industry Investment  
 
The underlying economic issue for utility regulation – as for monetary policy – is that 
governments, particularly at certain times, have a strong incentive to behave in a 
shortsighted and populist manner that reduces welfare summed over a medium to 
long-term period.  Hence, both in general but particularly at times of pressure, they 
place a very high weight on retail electricity prices over the next year relative to the 
medium to long term.  In consequence, in the utilities industry context, authoritarian 
governments facing serious protests (and democratic governments facing difficulties 
in imminent elections) have a strong incentive to hold down electricity prices below 
economic cost even if this jeopardises future investment and consumption.   
 
This is very similar to the well-known time inconsistency problem in monetary 
policy7 under which: 
 
(a) governments always have an incentive to have a short-term monetary 
expansion to boost economic growth  and reduce unemployment just 
before an election leaving the next government to deal with the 
resulting inflation;  and
 
(b) market participants know that Governments have such an incentive so 
that they are very likely to discount Government statements on the 
need for a stable anti-inflationary policy, however strongly made. 
 
But, in the utilities area as well, private investors know that governments have such 
incentives and take this into account in their behaviour.  In practice, that means 
attempting to negotiate binding contracts that prevent such strategic behaviour but 
which are highly sub-optimal in terms of technical and allocative efficiency.  
Typically, such contracts also incorporate a high cost of capital, highly front-end 
loaded returns or similar as a way of attempting to mitigate the risks.  In practice, 
these techniques are often unsuccessful and the contracts are unsustainable and 
                                                 
6  We looked, in passing, at methods of price/profits regulation in our empirical work but this 
issue was a subsidiary concern for this paper.  See Section 4 for the results. 
7  See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983). 
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collapse with a messy workout - as seen in electricity-related contracts in Asia after 
1997 and Argentina since 2000. 
 
Both for monetary policy and utility regulation, the critical issue is the weight given to 
the welfare of future consumers (and taxpayers) relative to current consumers.  Thus, 
in the UK, the independent Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is charged with 
setting interest rates to achieve a medium-term inflation target i.e. 2-3 years ahead.  
Similarly, the UK Utilities Act 2000 states that the protection of consumers is the 
prime objective of regulation, but explicitly defines consumers to include future 
consumers as well as current consumers8.   
 
However, not only is the underlying problem essentially the same in the monetary 
policy and utility regulation cases, but so is the standard recommended institutional 
remedy.  In the monetary policy case, it is an independent central bank and in the 
utility regulation case it is an independent regulatory agency9.   For utility service 
industries, the fall-back solution, where such contracts are unsustainable (and where 
credibility cannot be provided by a regulatory or other institutional solution) is that 
the utility is operated as a state-owned vertically integrated company (i.e. as a 
“nationalized industry”).  This, of course, has many other disadvantages e.g. on 
incentives and efficiency levels.   
 
Given the equivalence between the monetary policy and utility regulation 
commitment issues, we can learn a lot about the likely determinants of regulatory 
effectiveness from the sizeable empirical literature over the last 10-15 years on the 
effectiveness of independent central banks (ICBs) and its determinants.  In particular, 
we can usefully learn from the studies of the impact of governance arrangements on 
ICB effectiveness.   
  
2.1.1. Modelling Implications of ICB and Utility Regulation Equivalence 
 
There are two particular reasons why the substantial empirical literature on ICB 
effectiveness is useful in considering how best to model the effectiveness of utility 
industry regulatory agencies.  These are as follows: 
 
(i) Few countries develop independent utility regulatory institutions that 
do not already have an independent central bank;  and 
 
(ii) Countries that have difficulties in sustaining an effective ICB also have 
difficulties in sustaining effective utility regulatory agencies (e.g. 
Argentina, Bulgaria). 
 
These points demonstrate the relationship between the ICB and regulatory 
effectiveness issues with the wider question of the role of institutions in promoting 
and sustaining good policies and strong growth.    In addition, they also raise the issue 
of what can reasonably be expected from regulatory agencies in difficult 
environments where the rule of law and civil society institutions are weak and 
corruption may be pervasive.   
                                                 
8  See Section 9(6) and 10(6). 
9  See Stern and Trillas (2003) for a verbal discussion of these issues and Levine, Stern and 
Trillas (2003) for a full formal exposition.  See also Chapter 2 of Newbery (1999). 
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The recent survey article by Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2000) provides a good 
overview of the impact of ICB governance aspects on their performance.  For this 
paper, the key results that emerge are: 
 
1) ICBs are associated with lower average inflation rates (but not, in general, 
with higher growth rates or lower average unemployment rates).  The inflation 
result is robust to measures of inflation aversion. 
 
2) For OECD countries, the ICB governance indicator best associated with lower 
inflation is a measure of formal legal characteristics (e.g. an index).  The 
relationship appears to be “quite robust”10. 
 
3) For developing countries (low and middle income) as a whole, legal ICB 
indicators have little or no explanatory power whereas practice is significant 
and correctly signed.  The typical measure of ICB (and government) practice 
is the turnover rate of Central Bank governors (e.g. the probability that 
governors will be replaced within a short time of a change in government)11. 
 
The evidence strongly suggests (a) that ICBs do reduce the average rate of inflation; 
and (b) that the quality of their governance is important in their effectiveness.  
However, the relevant measure of governance quality seems to vary between OECD 
and developing countries.  For OECD countries, the government and other parties 
involved appear to follow the “rules of the game” as set out in the relevant law and 
supporting regulations – there do not seem to be major differences in ICB 
performance cet par on the quality of the legal framework.   But, for developing 
countries, particularly developing countries with political instability involving radical 
changes of government, the relevant measure of quality seems to be how far the law is 
observed in practice and in spirit – hence, the importance of turnover rates for ICB 
governors. 
 
However, some recent work suggests that the effect of the turnover rate of CB 
governors on developing country inflation rates is only significant if high inflation 
countries are included.  Sturm and De Haan (1999) find that excluding these 
observations leads to significance of coefficients on the legal indicators in developing 
countries.   
 
In addition, recent work on ICB information transparency shows that greater and 
more effective transparency is associated with fewer surprises (i.e. less uncertainty) in 
financial markets and there is some evidence that it is associated with better macro-
economic outcomes12.  However, it seems to take longer for developing countries to 
achieve the benefits of transparency, presumably because it takes longer to establish 
the credibility that the transparency is reliable and will be maintained13.   
 
                                                 
10  See Berger et al, op cit, p.29. 
11  This result, first  established in Cukierman (1992) and discussed in detail in Cukierman and 
Webb (1995), has been replicated in a number of other studies.   
12  See Geraats (2002). 
13  See Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz (2003). 
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The importance of transparency and the time required for developing countries to 
establish their reputation and credibility are also important for utility service 
regulators as we will discuss below. 
 
One final point is that the same indicators of governance quality have been found 
important both for ICBs and utility regulatory agencies e.g. clarity of objectives and 
assignment of functions between government and ICB, stable and depoliticised 
funding and appointment of governors/commissioners and, most importantly, fixed 
terms of office plus protection against dismissal except for proven and serious 
malfeasance.  In politicised environments, this last condition is often failed.  Even 
where it exists in the law, ways around the law are often found in practice in some 
(but by no means all) developing countries, viz the examples of Argentina and 
Bulgaria cited above. 
 
(See Stern and Cubbin (2003) for a fuller discussion of the issues raised in this section 
and below.) 
 
2.2 Governance Measures for Utility Regulatory Agencies 
 
The previous section has outlined the underlying time inconsistency problem for 
which independent regulatory agencies are intended to provide a solution.  For utility 
service industries, long-term contracts without a regulatory agency may be sufficient 
in some circumstances to provide the necessary institutional surety (e.g. for toll roads, 
water and sewage and similar).  However, a regulatory agency may well help improve 
the sustainability of contracts even in those industries14.  For electricity, although 
contracts may play a large part, they do not seem to be able to substitute for regulation 
in providing a sound basis for private investment in generation, let alone in 
transmission and distribution15.   
 
In consequence, we assume in what follows that an independent regulatory agency is 
the first-best method of ensuring that private investment in the electricity and similar 
industries can be sustained and at the lowest possible cost of capital.  Similarly, an 
independent regulatory agency seems to be the best way of providing effective but 
reasonable incentives for efficiency and high productivity – and strong growth in 
these.  The question then is what are the appropriate measures of governance to ensure 
the effectiveness of the regulatory agency in terms of these objectives. 
 
There is considerable consensus on the criteria for good governance in regulatory 
agencies16.  The key requirements are: 
 
1.) A strong legal framework where the rule of law is observed, contracts 
can be enforced and there are sound commercial and other courts 
which make their decisions in a timely manner. 
 
                                                 
14  See Guasch, J.L., Laffont, J.J. & Straub, S., (2003) for a discussion of renegotiation of water 
and transport concession contracts in Latin America. 
15  See Stern (2003) for a discussion of these issues in the context of the development of the UK 
electricity industry pre-1940. 
16  See among others Levy and Spiller (1994), Smith (1997), Stern and Holder (1999), Noll 
(2001).  For a full discussion, see Stern and Cubbin (2003) 
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¾ Reliable and well-defined legal processes are crucial as are 
appeal provisions. 
¾ Trying to develop effective regulatory institutions in the 
absence of an effective rule of law is, at best, extremely 
difficult and, at worst, impossible. 
2.) The formal legal attributes of regulation must be clearly articulated 
and preferably in a primary law.  This implies 
 
¾ Clarity of roles and objectives between regulator, Government 
and regulated companies – coherence of the assignment of 
functions 
¾ Autonomy of the regulatory agency e.g. in funding, staffing, 
appointments and dismissals  
¾ Accountability of the regulator e.g. responsibilities to 
legislature, rights of appeals and redress  
 
3.) The regulatory agency must operate in practice in ways that encourage 
good practice and consistent, reliable decision-making – adequacy on 
informal attributes of regulation.  This implies 
 
¾ Transparency e.g. publication of licenses, methodologies, 
decisions and the reasons for decisions 
¾ Participation e.g. the involvement of major stakeholders in the 
regulatory process via consultations and published responses to 
consultations   
¾ Predictability e.g. constraints on arbitrary changes of regulatory 
or regulated companies powers and duties, publication and use 
of regulatory principles, consistency of decision making 
 
It is worth noting that regulatory governance becomes more important the more 
discretion that regulatory agencies have.  Some regulatory discretion is inevitable 
even if regulatory laws are written to try to eliminate it (e.g. in Chile and some other 
Latin American countries). Levy and Spiller argued that it should be minimised and 
hence concentrated on the legal context in 1.) above.  Subsequent commentators have 
placed much more emphasis on the governance aspects of the regulatory agency e.g. 
on the issues in 2.) and 3.) above17. 
 
It has also been increasingly recognised that the effectiveness of regulatory agencies 
depends on adequate human resources – especially the number of qualified 
professionals18.  This is particularly important for regulators operating with more 
discretion. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17  See Stern and Cubbin op cit for a full discussion. 
18  See, for instance, Noll (2001) and Domah, Pollitt and Stern (2002). 
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2.3 Evidence on Quality of Regulatory Governance and Modelling 
Implications 
 
There have been many case-studies of regulatory agencies and their performance both 
for OECD countries and for developing countries, but few systematic comparative 
studies.   
 
For high income countries (e.g. North America, EU member states and similar), there 
have not been major concerns about the quality of governance of regulatory 
institutions for electricity or other infrastructure industries.  Some countries (e.g. 
Germany, New Zealand) have tried – and failed – to do without regulatory agencies.  
In general, regulatory laws and the way that they have been applied in practice are 
undoubtedly less than perfect but there have not been any obvious major failures.   
 
In general, in high income countries, independent regulatory agencies have grown in 
number and in scope and no country has reverted to regulation by government 
Ministry or just by contract and the courts.  For electricity, the main problems have 
been in market design e.g. in the design and operation of generation markets and their 
interaction with transmission.  In particular, OECD and other studies suggest that the 
quality of enforcement appears reasonably good and broadly comparable in quality 
across such countries. 
 
This is not the case in developing and transitional economies (DTEs).  Examination of 
electricity or energy laws shows considerable variations in quality and many countries 
do not have electricity or similar laws that establish regulatory powers and duties.  In 
general, countries with independent regulatory agencies establish the agency by a 
primary law; but, in some cases, it is established by Decree which makes its legal 
basis significantly less secure.  
 
Of course, many DTEs retain a Ministry regulator with or without a law establishing 
regulatory powers and duties.  Also, many electricity laws that are ostensibly designed 
to establish independent regulatory agencies retain a governmental role or veto 
powers that seriously compromise the autonomy of the institution19.   
 
More importantly, the quality of implementation and enforcement of regulatory laws 
varies considerably across DTEs.  Both case studies and the few systematic studies 
that have been done to evaluate the quality of regulatory frameworks show that 
regulatory practice is consistently worse than the formal legal provisions20.  For 
instance, among regulatory agencies, requirements for publishing reasons for 
decisions – or even annual reports - are often just not observed.  On the other side, 
regulated companies, often colluding with governments, outflank or ignore regulatory 
requirements that they dislike21.  
 
                                                 
19  See Kennedy (2003) for a recent survey of the quality of Central and East European and CIS 
electricity/energy laws. 
20  See the Prayas Report (2003) for an excellent – and worrying - recent survey of the regulatory 
process of State Regulators in India.  See Stern and Holder (1999) for an earlier survey across 
five Asian developing economies.   
21  See the discussion in Stern and Cubbin op cit of the Prayas Report and Kennedy (2002). 
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This last point is important for the analysis of the effectiveness of regulatory 
institutions on outcomes.  As yet, data on regulatory governance across DTEs is 
confined to some measures of a few formal governance properties, typically on the 
degree of formal independence.  This is also true of our work reported in Section 4 
below.  There is, as yet, virtually no comparable data across DTEs on the informal, 
practical and process aspects of regulation or on the quality of regulatory decisions (if 
this last could be established). 
 
The absence of data on the non-formal aspects is not only unfortunate but also implies 
a potentially serious errors-in-variables problem in econometric estimation of the 
impact of governance variables on industry outcomes.  A very preliminary 
investigation of this last using the Stern-Holder data set suggested a downward bias 
on estimated coefficients of around 5-10%.  However, the Stern-Holder data set 
contained relatively little data on non-formal governance aspects than on formal ones 
so that it was far from an ideal test-bed for testing the bias22.  The true bias could be 
significantly larger and this should be borne in mind in considering the results of our 
study as well as of other studies of regulatory effectiveness. 
 
2.4 Output Measures for Utility Regulatory Agencies 
 
When estimating the effects of governance variables for ICBs, there is relatively little 
problem in deciding on relevant output measures either for developed or developing 
countries.  For all countries, rich or poor, the same output measure apply - lower and 
less variable average inflation rates, lower and less variable unemployment rates and 
higher growth rates. 
 
Unfortunately, the same does not apply to utility service industries.  For all countries, 
rich and poor, a relevant output is higher levels of (and faster growing) technical and 
efficiency as well as quality of service.  However, whereas virtually all developing 
countries need significant increases in capacity to meet demand – at least in electricity 
supply, the same is by no means always true for rich countries.  One of the main 
drivers of the liberalisation plus privatisation plus independent regulation OECD 
electricity reform model has been the desire to reduce unnecessarily high capacity 
reserve margins as well as to reduce investment costs.  Similarly, after 1989, the CEE 
and CIS post-Communist transition countries inherited a large surplus of generation 
and transmission capacity. 
 
This issue is important since significantly higher investment (and private investment) 
was the single most important reason cited over the last 15 years by the World Bank 
and similar policy institutions for the promotion of independent regulatory agencies in 
electricity and similar utility service industries23.  This view goes back to the 
underlying time-inconsistency problem and the question of how, given limited tax 
resources, developing countries can increase capacity and reduced unserved demand – 
particularly for countries with poor reputations as regards their treatment of private 
investment.  Hence, an independent regulatory agency has been advocated as the way 
in which private investors can be assured that they will be able to earn a reasonable 
rate of return.   
                                                 
22  See Stern and Cubbin op cit, p. 30-32 for a fuller account. 
23  The World Bank’s 1994 World Development Report “Infrastructure for Development” is a 
good example.  See Chapter 3. 
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In consequence, on this hypothesis, it is to be expected that sizeable private 
investment flows (domestic and foreign) will arise in developing country electricity 
and similar industries following the establishment of an independent regulatory 
agency.  It is, however, worth noting that the speed at which the regulatory credibility 
is established is very unclear.  It is likely to take some time, so that one might well 
expect lags of some years between the establishment of the new regulatory agencies 
and any significant increase in investment. 
 
The implications of the above are that, in estimating the impact of regulatory 
governance variables on outcomes, we concentrate on: 
 
(i) Electricity capacity levels in developing countries, excluding transition 
economies as well as OECD countries;  and 
 
(ii) Efficiency measures in developing countries, insofar as they are 
available.  
 
We discuss the precise statistical measures of these in the next section.  However, the 
key point to note here is that we have chosen our sample so that it includes only 
countries where there is good reason to believe that there are significant amounts of 
unsatisfied electricity demand because of capacity constraints.   
 
. 
2.4.1. Results from Studies of Regulation on Developing Country 
Telecommunications Outcomes 
 
The approach outlined above is echoed in a rapidly growing literature on the impact 
of regulation on telecom outcomes.  That literature has developed in recent years:  (a) 
because there are more countries with independent regulatory agencies for telecoms 
which have 5 years or more of existence (at least of legal existence)24; and (b) because 
of the growing availability of high quality and comprehensive data on telecom reform 
in developing countries25.  
 
The main empirical papers in this area (e.g. Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran (2003), 
Wallsten (2002) and Gutierrez (2003)) estimate the effects of regulation on  
 
(i)  mainline penetration rates (a standard measure of capacity) and  
 
(b)  efficiency (e.g. mainlines per employee).   
 
They typically estimate panel data models (primarily fixed effects models) with one 
or other of the outcome measures as the dependent variable, and include regulatory 
variables as independent variables along with competition and privatisation variables, 
                                                 
24  See Wallsten (2002), Table 1  
25  The key data set is the ITU-World Bank Database on telecommunications policy.  There is 
also the data from the Stanford –World Bank database (for Latin America) and the World 
Bank African Telecommunications Research Project
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as well as standard control variables.  We follow this approach in estimating the 
impact of regulation on electricity industry outcomes.   
 
The standard model estimated in these papers (e.g. by Gutierrez) is  
   
  Yit = Xitβ + Ditδ + αi + εit,   i =1, …, N;  j = 1, …, T     (Equ 1) 
 
 where X is a vector of exogenous variables,  
D is a vector of dummy variables,   
αi is a country specific fixed effect and  
εit, is an error model.  
 
The X vector includes both regulatory variables and standard control variables  
 
The approach of Gutierrez (2003) is particularly relevant to this paper.  He constructs 
a regulatory governance index for his sample of 22 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries.  This 7-element index (derived from the Stern-Holder typology) is 
calculated from examination of each country’s telecom laws and changes in the laws.  
In our model for electricity outcomes, we adopt a similar approach and use a 
‘snapshot’ 4-element index for 2000.  (See Section 4 below for further details of our 
index and the data.) 
 
Fink et al (2003) and Wallsten (2002) find that the presence of a telecoms regulator 
has a statistically significant association both with mainline penetration rates and with 
efficiency, but only indirectly via enhancing the effects of competition and 
privatisation.  However, in neither paper is the regulatory measure strong and in both 
it is difficult to separate the dating of changes in privatisation, competition and 
regulation.   
 
Gutierrez (2003) is stronger on all these aspects and he finds statistically and positive 
direct effects of his regulatory index both on tele-density and on efficiency.  This 
result occurs both in static and dynamic models and after testing for the endogeneity 
of regulation26.  The estimated effect of a 1-point increase in the index on mainlines 
per 100 inhabitants varies somewhat depending on the precise model specification but 
is, in general, of the order of 20%. 
 
The Gutierrez study and its estimates provide a useful benchmark for our modelling of 
the effects of regulation on developing country electricity industry outcomes27. 
 
2.4.2. Results from Studies of Regulation on Developing Country 
Electricity Industry Outcomes 
 
As yet, there are only a very few and very preliminary empirical studies e.g. Zhang, 
Kirkpatrick and Parker (2002) and a part of Pargal (2003).  For data availability 
reasons, the capacity variable for these studies is generation capacity only.  Data on 
this is available on an annual basis from the US Department of Energy’s EIA website 
                                                 
 
27  See Stern and Cubbin op cit, p. 38-43 for further details of these studies 
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for almost all countries from 1980.  Unfortunately, there is nothing similar available 
for capacity in transmission or distribution28. 
 
These papers find only weak effects of regulation, if any, and there are major 
problems in disentangling the effects of regulation from those of liberalisation.  
However, the studies are much more preliminary than those for telecoms, particularly 
in data terms.   
 
In this paper, we have had access to much better data on regulatory governance and its 
variation across countries.  However, our estimation of models for capacity, like those 
of Zhang et al and Pargal, is also limited to generation capacity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  Pargal uses the Calderon –Serven infrastructure investment data set for 9 Latin American 
countries 1980-98.  This divides electricity investment into public and private but appears, 
again, only to cover generation.  See Calderon and Serven (2002) for a description of these 
data.  
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3. Model Specification and Modelling Issues 
 
Our modelling work is primarily concerned with whether better regulatory 
governance in developing countries: 
 
 (i) increases rated generation capacity per capita; and 
 
(ii) increases efficiency e.g. by increasing capacity utilisation in generation 
and/or reducing transmission and distribution losses. 
 
3.1  Underlying Economic Rationale 
 
On capacity, we start from the basis that developing countries have serious capacity 
constraints which lead to significant unserved demand arising, among other reasons. 
from many years of low levels of investment.  In developing countries, it has typically 
been  the case that electricity supplies were inadequate and intermittent.  Supply was 
insufficient to cope with the level of demand as a result of several interconnected 
factors including: 
 
• Lack of investment in generation, transmission and distribution 
• Social pricing policies which led to inadequate returns on investment 
• Public ownership associated with policy goals unrelated to electricity 
production 
• Various other factors. 
Rectifying the issue of inadequate levels of capacity and investment has been a major 
policy objective and a justification for electricity sector reform shared by developing 
country governments and development agencies, national and international, including 
the World Bank and the international regional banks. 
 
The World Bank and others have argued that the establishment of good regulatory 
governance (e.g. via the development of well-founded independent regulatory 
agencies) has been a key element in their reform strategy over the last 15 or more 
years.  Hence, estimating whether regulatory agencies have significant impacts on 
electricity capacity levels over time is important for the effectiveness of the policy.  
This also provides a test of the theoretical case for the importance of time 
inconsistency arguments as a useful framework for considering investment in the 
electricity industry. 
 
Of course, inadequate supply levels are not due just to inadequate investment.  In 
many developing countries, rated capacity has been much higher than available 
capacity.  However, the same factors (e.g. revenue shortages and inadequate returns) 
also lead to low levels of maintenance.  This is a major reason for expecting that 
improvements in regulatory governance will increase efficiency and raise capacity 
utilisation rates. 
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3.1.1  Regulation and Capacity Levels 
 
The effect of electricity reform and the introduction of explicit regulation is to focus 
the policy of the electricity  industry on providing sufficient supplies.   In some cases, 
this has been done by harnessing the forces of private ownership and/or competition.  
In others, it has to provide a workable financial framework within which the 
electricity industry could develop by loosening the ties with government – for 
example, by enacting an electricity law giving various powers and duties to a Ministry 
regulator thereby requiring publicly owned electricity companies to operate in a more 
commercial way. 
 
Investment is encouraged once effective regulation is available to support a workable 
financial framework.  If the electricity industry is in private ownership the owners 
have the prospect of a return on their investment; if publicly owned, the industry can 
become independent of tax revenue or continually increasing loans.  In addition, the 
existence of an effective regulatory framework can also encourage the growth of 
private investment and/or private finance within state systems, as has been happening 
in recent years in India and China.  
 
These considerations suggest that the presence of an effective regulatory framework 
should, in general, lead to increased investment in the electricity sector, including the 
balanced development of generation, transmission, and distribution ceteris paribus.  
Unfortunately, comparable time-series capacity data across countries only exists for 
generation and it is on this aspect that the present study focuses. 
  
In an unconstrained market economy, per capita generation capacity will adjust to the 
level of demand, which will depend upon the level of per capita income, the price of 
electricity, and environmental factors such as climate.  The price of electricity will be 
determined in part by the efficiency of the sector.  The latter may depend upon 
regulatory factors, but also availability of energy sources such as hydro, gas, oil, and 
coal.  (This is most evident in cross-US comparisons of prices.)  However, many 
developing countries with a traditional, vertically integrated and state-owned 
electricity sector will be constrained not so much by market demand but by the 
availability of continuing subsidy. 
 
The capacity constraints arise because of either inadequate government revenues for 
electricity investment or subsidy payments and/or insufficient revenue flow to support 
viable private investment.  A simple diagrammatic version of such a model is shown 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Chronic Supply Constrained Electricity Shortage (loss making 
public enterprise) 
 
 
In this model, the level of capacity in the unreformed industry depends on the sum of 
private and public expenditure on investment in electricity which, in turn, will be 
determined primarily by the level of national income per capita.  It is also well-
established that the demand for electricity (and hence for electricity capacity) has an 
elasticity close to 1 with respect to GDP.   Hence, we would expect equilibrium 
electricity demand and supply for electricity to be related to GDP growth.   
Private 
expenditure 
Capacity 
Subsidy 
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Demand 
Quantity 
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reform 
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Supply with subsidy 
Supply without subsidy 
 
For both these reasons, we include per capita GDP in our model, with an expected 
long-run elasticity not significantly different from 1.  
 
One reason why equilibrium electricity demand and supply for electricity might grow 
faster or slower than GDP is if the share of industrial output in GDP were changing 
significantly.  A rapidly growing share of industrial output (particularly in heavy 
industry such as aluminium smelting, iron and steel, etc) might be expected to 
increase the demand for electricity over and above what might be expected given 
GDP growth.  In addition, in unreformed energy industries, retail industrial electricity 
prices are typically relatively high both compared to LRMC (long-run marginal cost) 
and to prices paid by households and small farmers.  Hence, in unreformed systems, 
the extra revenue coming from a larger share of industrial consumers should increase 
electricity industry revenues and help ease investment financing problems.   
 
For both these reasons, we include in our model the share of industrial value added as 
a percentage of GDP, with an expected positive coefficient. 
 
The level of indebtedness is also highly likely, through the impact of borrowing 
constraints, to affect the ability of developing country governments to finance 
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domestic public electricity investment, directly or by subsiding public enterprise 
losses.  For private investment, particularly foreign private investment, high levels of 
government indebtedness are likely to be a significant risk factor discouraging 
investment (and one which effective regulatory institutions are intended to mitigate.) 
 
For these reasons, we include in our model the share of government debt service as a 
proportion of gross national income.  We would expect a negative coefficient on this 
variable.      
 
The effect of an effective regulatory framework should be to reduce the constraint on 
the operation of the market, increasing supply and moving the outcome closer to the 
market equilibrium.  The better the governance of the regulator, the greater the 
expected increase in capacity and increase in electricity supply. 
 
We measure the quality of governance primarily by an index of regulatory 
governance which has 4 elements: 
 
(i) Whether the country has an electricity or (energy) regulatory law; 
 
(ii) Whether the country has an autonomous or a Ministry regulator for 
electricity; 
 
(iii) Whether the country’s electricity regulator is funded from licence fees 
(or equivalent) or out of the government budget; and 
 
(iv) Whether the staff in the electricity regulator can be paid as appropriate 
given skill needs and labour markets or whether staff have to be paid 
on civil service pay scales. 
 
These are all measured by 0/1 dummies.  The highest governance ranking (a score of 
4 on the index) is represented by having enacted an electricity regulatory law, plus an 
autonomous regulator, plus funding from licence fees and the staff not being confined 
to civil service pay scales.  The dating of the switch from 0 to 1 on the appropriate 
variables (subsequently maintained at a constant level) is derived from the date of 
enactment of the law (except for cases where other information was available to 
provide a known, superior alternative).  Hence, we can investigate the effect of age of 
the regulatory agency as well as its existence.   
 
Given the economic arguments set out above and in Section 2, we would expect the 
coefficients on the index and on each of its components to be positive.  We might also 
expect the effect of regulation to increase with the age of the regulator, particularly for 
the first few years. 
 
In terms of the typology in Section 2.2, the regulatory variables in our index are all 
measures of formal attributes of regulation.  Unfortunately, no comparable data is 
currently available on the informal, practical qualities of electricity regulation and the 
necessary omission of data on these characteristics must be borne in mind when 
considering the results, including potential biases to the estimates and to estimated 
standard errors.  In addition, unlike Gutierrez (2003), we have no time dimension on 
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changes in formal governance attributes subsequent to the enactment of the 
electricity/energy regulatory law. 
 
In Section 2.2, we also refer to the background legal and related characteristics within 
which electricity regulators operate.  We test for these using indicators for the rule of 
law and for corruption levels derived from the Kaufmann indices. 
  
We would expect that a higher ranking on the rule of law would have a positive 
impact on generation capacity either directly or via an interaction term with our 
specific regulatory measures.  A higher ranking on corruption might be expected to 
have a negative impact on generation capacity. 
 
These considerations suggest a capacity model of the following form: 
 
Log(ELCAPPC)it  = (a0 + ai) + a1 log(GDPPC)it + a2 Industryit + a3 Debtit + a4 
RegIndexit + a5 Xit + uit    
(Equ. 2) 
 
Where Log ELCAPPC is the log of per capita electricity generation capacity 
in Gigawatts; 
 
 a0 is a constant term;  
 
ai is a time-invariant country specific fixed effect 
 
GDPPC is real per capita national income in $US 199529; 
 
 Industry is the log of industry value added as a percentage of GDP; 
 
 Debt is the share of government debt service as a percentage of gross 
national income; 
 
 RegIndex is our regulatory governance index (or individual 
components of it); 
 
 X is a vector of other potentially relevant variables (e.g. rule of law and 
corruption measures, age of regulatory agency, method of price 
regulation, etc); and  
 
 uit is an error term 
 
In all cases, the variables exist for i = 1, …, I countries over t = 1, …., T time periods.   
 
The regulatory index takes the value of 0,1, 2, 3 or 4 where zero is ascribed to 
countries with a Ministry regulator, no electricity regulatory law, government budget 
funding and civil service pay scales.   
 
                                                 
29  Hence, GDP is on an exchange rate rather than a PPP basis. 
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The X vector for this equation might well include domestic fuel/hydro source 
availability and a variety of other country specific economic and/or institutional 
variables.  However, these variables can be expected to stay fairly constant over the 
period of estimation. 
 
Following the literature on the impact of telecom reform in developing countries, we 
also explore the role of (i) privatisation and (ii) competition on generation capacity 
growth.  We investigate both direct and indirect effects (e.g. interactions between 
these variables and the regulatory index). 
 
Although we start by estimating an OLS version of the model above, most of the 
results reported in Section 4 are for a fixed effects model30.  Differencing the equation 
above eliminates the constant term and the country-specific fixed effects.  If fixed 
effects are significant, the error term the equation above will not be normally 
distributed with zero mean when estimated by OLS.  (See Section 3.2.2 below for a 
fuller discussion of econometric issues.)  
 
The fixed effects are likely to include country variables with little or no time variation 
over the sample period including not just fuel source availability, but also many 
constant or slowly changing institutional variables. The eliminated fixed effects may 
therefore capture some of the aspects of the rule of law and corruption as country 
rankings on these indicators tend to be relatively stable over 10-20 year periods. 
 
The theoretical basis for positive regulatory effects on investment applies to all 
commercialised electricity industries, public or private.  However, they are likely to 
be stronger the greater the role of private investment.  In consequence, we also 
estimate a variant of the capacity model above for a set of 9 Latin American countries 
for which generation data split by public/private is now available.    
 
The equation above is a static representation of the model, which provide evidence on 
long-run equilibrium effects.  We also consider dynamic variants e.g. incorporating a 
lagged dependent variable31.  
 
3.1.2  Regulation and Efficiency 
 
As regards efficiency, we concentrated on the impact of regulation on two readily 
measurable characteristics of electricity supply industries for which comparable time-
series data existed: 
 
(i) Utilisation of generation capacity; and 
 
(ii) Technical losses in transmission and distribution. 
 
The first was measured as:   
 
(Total Annual Generation in TWh)/(Generation Capacity in TW/365 * 24). 
                                                 
30  See Section 3.3.2 .1 below for a fuller discussion of heterogeneity issues. 
31  See Section 3.3.2.3 below for a fuller discussion.  Fink et al (2003), Appendix 4 has a 
discussion of estimation issues in panel data models in the context of the estimation of the 
impact of regulation and other policy variables on telecom industry outcomes. 
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This measure provides a good proxy for the availability of generation plant.  Many 
developing countries have rated capacity levels that are considerably higher than 
available capacity and higher utilisation rates should closely reflect improvements in 
availability e.g. from the impact of better regulatory governance on maintenance 
expenditure. 
 
Technical losses were measured as transmission and distribution losses as a 
percentage of total generation. 
 
In both cases, we deliberately estimated a simple and parsimonious fixed effects 
model with the regulatory index as the main explanatory variable and real per capita 
GDP as a control variable.  This was, not least, because there was no obvious well-
defined theoretical model on which to base a more sophisticated approach. 
 
We would very much have liked to estimate models for quality of supply (e.g. supply 
interruptions, coverage of system) and also for commercial losses.  Empirical studies 
of electricity reform have shown that a major impact has been to improve quality and 
to reduce non-technical losses, particularly at the distribution level32.  Unfortunately, 
no data currently exists for these variables that would allow the estimation of cross-
country panel data models to test for the impact of improved regulation on quality. 
 
We again estimated static and dynamic models for utilisation and technical losses. 
 
3.2 Modelling Approach 
 
The purpose of the investigation was: 
  
a)  to undertake a preliminary analysis for the electricity industry of the effect of 
independent regulators and aspects of their governance on improving the 
overall performance of the sector; and 
 
b)  to identify priority areas where enhanced data was required to allow a better 
analysis of these effects. 
 
Under a), the key questions we have tried to answer are: 
 
i)  Does the existence of an independent regulator appear to have any effects on 
measurable aspects of electricity industry performance  (generation capacity, 
utilisation and technical losses)? 
 
ii) If so, how big is the effect? 
 
iii) By how much is the size of any effect influenced by measurable aspects of the 
governance of the regulatory institutions? 
 
                                                 
32  See, for instance, Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) 
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iv)  What effects do private ownership and competition have in enhancing the 
aspects of performance we have measured, independently and in combination 
with regulation? 
 
On b), the quality and precision of the answers to these questions should help us to 
identify priorities for improvements on currently measured data.  Consideration of the 
potential impact on the results of omitted variables and the resulting potential biases 
should help identify priorities for collecting data on variables for which data is not 
currently available. 
 
3.2.1.  Data  
 
We have collected data on 28 developing countries over a 21 year period (1980-
2001). Of the 28 countries in the sample, 15 were in Latin America, 6 in the 
Caribbean, 4 were in Asia and 5 were in Africa.  The list of countries includes large 
countries (e.g. Brazil and India), small countries (e.g. Jamaica); middle income 
countries (e.g. Chile and Mexico) and poor countries (e.g. Ethiopia and Sudan).  The 
full list of countries for which we have data is in the Appendix.  
 
We also use a 9 country Latin American sample for an 18 year period  (1980-1998) to 
exploe the effects of regulation on private investment in electricity generation. 
 
Although much of the regulatory activity took place in the last half of the data set, the 
earlier period is important in effectively establishing benchmark levels of the 
dependent variables, and also in reducing some of the biases that can potentially arise 
in the use of short panels.   In fact, 20.7% of the total number of country-sample years 
were years with an autonomous regulator and 31% with an electricity or energy 
regulatory law.   
 
 3.2.1.1  Data Sources 
 
Data used in the results reported here were taken from the following sources: 
 
• World Total Generation Capacity, World Total Generation:  US Energy 
Information Agency - individual country data  
• Electric power transmission and distribution losses;  Per capita GDP in 
$US1995; NPV of debt as a percentage of gross national income; industry 
value added  as a percentage of GDP:  World Bank Development 
Indicators 
• Components for index of governance for electricity regulators and other 
data on electricity regulation and regulators; Electricity industry technical 
characteristics, competition and privatisation:  mainly based on a survey 
in 2001 by Preetum Domah, supplemented by authors’ own research33 
                                                 
33  See Domah, Pollitt, and Stern (2002) for full details.  We are very grateful to Preetum Domah 
for permission to use the information from his survey in this paper. 
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• Individual country goverance indicators for (a) rule of law and (b) 
corruption in 199634: Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi, World Bank  
(2003)    
• Private investment in electricity generation for 9 Latin American 
countries:  Data from Calderon and Serven ( 2002) as reported in Pargal 
(2003).35   
This is the best data available in the absence of purpose-designed data-set(s) on which 
to estimate the effects of electricity reform of the kind that exist for telecoms.  It is 
very suitable for a preliminary investigation but is far from ideal.  In particular, it 
suffers from the following weaknesses: 
 
1) The data on electricity market structure is poor and the data on privatisation 
very limited;  
2) There is no data on the informal, practical aspects of regulation (e.g. security 
of tenure of regulatory agency heads or commissioners, etc); 
3) The data on regulatory governance, competition and privatisation has no time 
dimension beyond a simple 0/1 dichotomy from a single year;  
4) The data on the formal aspects of regulation only allows for a 4-element index 
rather than a larger index (e.g. 7-element telecom regulation index used by 
Gutierrez ). 
These weaknesses should be born in mind when considering the econometric results.   
 
3.2.2.  Econometric Issues 
 
Panel data generally gives rise to some opportunities for carrying out investigations 
that are not possible with single-year cross sections or single-country time series, but 
these give rise to a number of issues which need taking into account for estimation.  In 
our case, with data on 28 countries for 21 years, we have a large and long panel.  
Because of missing observations, it is an unbalanced panel. 
 
The use of panel data provides many opportunities but also raises a number of 
potential econometric problems which we discuss below. 
 
3.2.2.1  Coefficient Heterogeneity 
 
If countries differ in their responses to the explanatory variables in ways that are 
related to the levels of the explanatory variables then misleading conclusions may be 
drawn.  (See for example Hsiao pp 5-7, and figures 1.1 – 1.5 therein.)  Such 
heterogeneity may be in the intercept, the slope coefficients, or both. 
 
We have strong prior views that countries will differ consistently in their intercepts 
according to persistent unmeasured local factors such as the availability of indigenous 
fuel sources and seasonal low or high temperatures.   For this reason our maintained 
                                                 
34  The indicators exist for 1998, 2000 and 2002 but not for earlier years.  In addition, rankings 
between countries on these countries change little and slowly. 
35  We are very grateful to Cesar Calderon and Luis Serven for permission to use their data. 
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hypothesis is that a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a random effects 
approach.  In addition, the fixed effects static model avoids the potential biases which 
could arise in the random effects model owing to correlation between the included 
exogenous variables and omitted country attributes. 
 
 
3.2.2.2  Dynamic structure 
 
Static models, which assume that all adjustment to disequilibrium occur within the 
period defined by observation frequency may be inappropriate.  In particular, 
investment in electricity is not usually completed in a year so we would expect that 
scope for some adjustment process would need to be incorporated into our model.   
 
Such processes can be modelled generally by a combination of lags on the dependent 
variable (autoregressive) and on the explanatory variables (moving average).  
 
However, the presence of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed-effects model can 
result in a biased estimates for the lagged dependent variable coefficient.  The size of 
the bias will depend on the number of time series, N, the length of the time series, T, 
and the influence of other exogenous variables in the determination of the dependent 
variable (See Hsiao, op cit). 
 
The problem is mainly significant in short panels.   For T=21 we have estimated the 
asymptotic bias (as N increases) to be of the order of 3%. This is an upper limit given 
the presence of other major influences on the dependent variable. 
 
 
 3.2.2.3  Endogeneity 
 
There has been much discussion of the need to take account of the endogeneity of 
regulatory agencies.  This has been a major theme in the ICB literature where the 
introduction of an ICB (particularly the early introduction) may be interpreted as a 
signal of strong commitment to anti-inflation policies.  Similarly, the introduction of 
an autonomous regulator (particularly the early introduction) may also be a signal of a 
strong commitment to commercialisation and the enforcement of property rights36.   
 
For telecom regulation, this issue was explored empirically in Gutierrez (2003).  His 
coefficient estimates for the impact of regulatory governance were little affected by 
correcting for potential endogeneity.  It is, however, difficult to find appropriate 
instruments. 
 
In the results reported below, we do not explicitly model for the potential endogeneity 
of regulation.  However, some of our main results are for equations with lagged 
values of the regulatory index.  Hence, we would argue that comparisons of the 
estimates with lagged and unlagged values of the index should provide an indication 
of whether or not a potentially serious endogeneity problem exists. 
 
 
                                                 
36  See Gual and Trillas (2002) 
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4. Results 
 
In this section, we report the results of our empirical analysis.  This is divided into 
two sections.  Firstly, we set out some key descriptive statistics; and then, secondly, 
we report and discuss the results of our econometric analysis. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In the tables below, we present some key descriptive statistics relating to electricity 
regulation and our sample of developing countries. 
 
4.1.1  Countries with Autonomous Electricity Regulators 
 
Table 1 shows that by 1998 just under half the countries in our sample had an 
autonomous electricity regulator37 – mainly in Latin America.  However, in the 
following three years 3 African and 1 Caribbean country joined the set.  Asia provides 
an exception to the spread of autonomous regulators with only 1 country (Philippines) 
having an autonomous regulator before 2001.  
 
By 2001, a majority of countries had regulators classified (at least in legal terms) as 
autonomous. 
 
Table 1:  The Trend towards Autonomous Regulators (by Continent) 
 
    1998 
 
2001 
  Total Ministry Autonomous Ministry Autonomous 
Africa 5 5 0 3 2 
Asia 4 3 1 3 1 
Carrib 6 3 3 2 4 
Latin America 13 4 9 4 9
Total 28 15 13 11 17 
Source:  Domah 2001 survey, supplemented and updated by authors 
 
4.1.2  Countries with Electricity Regulatory Laws 
 
Even where there was no autonomous regulator, laws for the reform of the ESI 
Including regulatory reform were being passed.  Table 2 shows the regional 
distribution of electricity reform laws for those states without autonomous regulation.  
According to the Domah data, all the countries with autonomous regulators had 
enacted an electricity regulatory law.  By the end of our sample period only two 
countries in the sample (Barbados and Indonesia) did not have any electricity 
regulatory law in place.     
 
These laws sometimes provided for IPPs or other elements of market reform, for 
commercialisation and sometimes for unbundling and competition in generation and 
supply.  If the laws covered regulation, they typically specified the powers and duties 
                                                 
37  The Domah questionnaire used the term “autonomous” rather than “independent”, not least 
because it is more neutral.  We treat the two terms as synonymous. 
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of the Ministry (or designated Ministry agency/department) in carrying out regulatory 
functions.  
 
Table 2:  Non-Autonomous Regulators:  Existence of Law 
 
    1998 
 
2001 
  Total Law No Law Law No Law 
Africa 5 0 5 3 0 
Asia 4 1 2 2 1 
Carrib 6 1 2 1 1 
Latin America  13 3 1 4 0 
Total 28 5 9 10 2 
Source:  Domah 2001 survey, supplemented and updated by authors 
 
4.1.3  Age Distribution of Autonomous Regulatory Agencies 
 
Many, but by no means all, of the autonomous regulators in the sample had been put 
in place after 1995.  This is shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2:  Age Distribution Of Autonomous Electricity Regulators 
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Source:  Domah 2001 survey, supplemented and updated by authors 
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Figure 2 shows clearly how many of the DTE regulatory agencies in our sample were 
very recently established.  8 (47%) were under 3-years old in 2001, including all the 
African electricity regulators.  The median age was just under 5 years.  However, 5 
(29%) were 10 years old or more and accounts for 42% of the total number of sample 
years with an autonomous regulator.  The over 13 year-old group of autonomous 
electricity regulatory agencies comprises Costa Rica, Philippines and Trinidad and 
Tobago.  
 
4.1.4  Ministry or Autonomous Regulator and Per Capita GDP 
 
Figure 3 shows, very interestingly, that – at least within this sample - there is little 
relationship between the existence of an autonomous regulator and per capita GDP.  
Both autonomous and Ministry regulators are scattered through the income range. 
 
 The mean income for countries with an autonomous electricity regulator was $3,500.  
For those with a ministry regulator it was $3,300.  The difference was not significant.  
However, low income countries with an autonomous regulator have younger 
regulators e.g.. the two Sub-Saharan African regulators established since 1998 (Kenya 
and Uganda). 
 
Figure 3: Type of Regulator and Per Capita Income (in Real $ 1995) 
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4.1.5  Generation Capacity and per Capita Income 
 
Figures 4 and 5 plot generation capacity by real GDP for our 28 country panel at the 
start and end of the period.  The plots show an upward sloping but by no means either 
uniform or linear relationship.  
 
Figure 4:  Generation Capacity and Income 1980 
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Source:  US Energy Information Agency and World Bank Development Indicators 
 
The outlier in the bottom right is Ecuador- as it was again in 2001.  In 2001, only 55% 
of the population had access to mains electricity, even though the country is Latin 
America’s largest oil exporter.   
 
Figure 5:  Generation Capacity and Income in 2000 
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The country at the top left of Figure 5 is Paraguay.  It is a major exporter of hydro-
power, and meets 25% and 40% respectively of Brazil and Argentia’s electricity 
demands.38  Interestingly, Ecuador has a (relatively young) autonomous regulator but 
Paraguay has a Ministry regulator.   
 
For the pooled sample, the elasticity of generation capacity with respect to real per 
capita GDP was 0.89 (with a standard error of 0.02).  The cross-section elasticities  
for selected years were as follows: 
 
Table 3:  Generation Capacity Real Income Elasticities 
 
Year Estimated Generation Capacity/ Real GDP 
Elasticities  
     (Standard error in parentheses) 
1980 0.78 
(0.09) 
  1990   0.90 
     (0.11) 
  2000   0.94 
     (0.11) 
 
Table 4 shows a trend towards the simple elasticity rising towards unity i.e. faster 
growth in generation capacity than in real income over the period.  It remains to be 
seen whether this is in any way related to the spread of electricity regulatory reform. 
 
4.1.6  Generation Capacity Utilisation 1980 and 2000 
 
Beginning and end-of-period generation capacity utilisation rates are shown in Figure 
6 below.  In general, there has been a noticeable increase in capacity utilisation, but 
there are country exceptions (e.g. Colombia). 
 
Figure 6:  Utilisation of Generation Capacity 1980 and 2000 
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Source:  US Energy Information Agency 
                                                 
38 See IEA country analysis brief :Paraguay at www.eia.doe.gov
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4.1.7  Correlation between Indicators of Regulatory Governance 
 
As discussed above, our regulatory index includes 4 indicators.  These are classified 
positively for:  (i) the enactment of an electricity regulatory law; (ii) the existence of 
an independent/autonomous regulator; (iii) funding from licence fees (or equivalent) 
and (v) staff salaries not necessarily confined to civil service pay scales. 
 
Although the majority of our results are based on the index, we also try to estimate 
their separate effects.  However, the degree to which we are able to do so depends on 
the levels to which they are correlated with one another.  Not surprisingly, they are 
highly inter-correlated as shown in Table 4 below.   
 
 
Table 4:  Correlation Matrix between Regulatory Governance Variables 
 
 
  ElAct Funding Orgtype Cserv 
ElAct 1    
Funding 0.848968 1   
Orgtype 0.783066 0.703489 1  
Cserv 0.783066 0.551221 0.442631 1
 
The correlations are highest within the law/funding/autonomy grouping. 
 
 
4.2 Econometric Results 
 
In what follows, we report various results.  In Table 5 below, we report the core 
results for our static model of per capita generation capacity.  Tables 6 and 7 report 
the results from variants on the static model. Table 8 reports some results of dynamic 
models of generation capacity and (for 9 Latin American countries) private 
investment in generation.   Table 10 reports some results for generation capacity 
utilisation and technical losses. 
 
4.2.1 Econometric Results for Models of Generation Capacity and 
Investment 
 
We start by reporting the results of an OLS equation as a baseline.   All subsequent 
equations are modelled using a fixed effects estimator.  Given the nature of the 
underlying model, we would expect a fixed effects model to be more appropriate than 
a random effects model.  For some of the equations, we tested this assumption using 
the Hausman test and the random effects model was consistently rejected in favour of 
a fixed effects model. 
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 4.2.1.1  Basic Static Generation Capacity Model Results 
 
 
The key results from Table 5 below are: 
 
• The fixed effects model clearly dominates the OLS model as shown in the 
standard error of estimate for the regressions.  
• The estimated coefficient on the regulatory index is significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level in Equations 1 and 2.  The implications of Equation 
2 (our basic fixed effects model) is that, in the long-run, each unit increase in 
the regulatory governance index increases per capita generation capacity by 
4.3 % so that a country with best regulatory governance practice and an index 
score of 4 could expect to have 17.2% higher generation capacity per capita. 
• Equations 3 and 4 include age of regulator variables as well as the regulatory 
index.  (The age of regulator variables - dummy and continuous - refer to all 
regulatory agencies, Ministry and autonomous, covered by a regulatory law.  
The estimated coefficient on the regulatory index is no longer statistically 
significantly different from zero even at the 10% level.     
• The impact of regulation clearly increases with age of regulator.  Equation 3 
suggests a long-run effect of regulators aged over 3 years of 35% on per capita 
generation capacity.  Equation 4, which assumes a quadratic effect of age of 
regulator, the impact of having a regulator peaks at 15 years39 
• The coefficient estimates for log(real GDP) are 0.7 - 0.8, with t-values of 8 or 
more. 
• The estimated coefficient on the debt variable is both very small and has a 
very high standard error.  Only in the OLS equation is the estimated 
coefficient on the GDP share of industry value-added significant at the 5% 
level or better. 
• The equations all have very low Durbin-Watson statistics which suggest that t-
values may be upward biased. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39  The implicit decline in effectiveness after 15 years is not well-founded as only one of our 
regulatory agencies (Costa Rica) has a regulator in place for more than 15 years  
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 Table 5:  Static Models for Generation Capacity 
Dependent Variable = 
Log(Electricity Generation 
capacity per capita) OLS model 
Basic FE 
model 
Age-of -
regulator 
dummies 
Quadratic in age 
of regulator 
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 4 
Constant -8.286    
 (-52.162)    
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.772 0.805 0.697 0.699
 (31.071) (9.970) (8.343) (8.522)
Debt payments as a 
proportion of national 
income 
4.14E-12 2.49E-12 -4.65E-13 1.07E-12
 (0.838) (0.556) (-0.104) (0.244)
Industry value added as 
proportion of GDP 
0.024 -0.002 0.000 0.001
 (7.981) (-0.607) (-0.003) (0.232)
Index of regulatory 
governance 0-4 
0.056 0.043 -0.026 -0.011
 (2.982) (3.444) (-1.067) (-0.638)
Regulator under 1 year 0.090
  (1.465)
Regulator 1-3 years  0.187
  (2.398)
Regulator aged over 3 
years  
0.353
  (4.370)
Age of regulator  0.055
  (4.132)
(Age of regulator)2  -0.002
  (-2.635)
  
Estimation method OLS 
Fixed 
effects
Fixed 
effects
Fixed effects
Adjusted R-squared 0.764 0.952 0.954 0.954
S.E. of regression 0.605 0.272 0.267 0.266
F-statistic 465.943 372.079 352.169 365.770
Durbin-Watson 0.043 0.161 0.163 0.153
No of observations 577 577 577  
Note:  t statistics in 
parentheses     
 
 
4.2.1.2 Impact of Individual Governance Index Components in Static 
Generation Capacity Model  
 
Table 6 reports the results taking sequentially each component of the index in 
counterpart equations to Equation 2.  The main features to note are: 
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• The largest regulatory effect – 18% (and the highest t-value) - is from having 
an electricity law; but, given the high level of collinearity with the other 
regulatory index measures shown in Table 4, this is almost certainly an 
upwardly biased estimate. 
• The negative sign on non-mandatory civil service pay scales (significant at the 
1% level) is the opposite of that predicted by regulatory governance theory.  
Table 6:  Static Models for Generation Capacity: Variants 1 
Dependent Variable = 
Log(Electricity Generation capacity 
per capita)      
 
Electricity 
Law 
Type of 
regulator Funding 
Staffing 
pay  
Explanatory variables 5 6 7 8 
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.722 0.848 0.818 0.747
 (8.755) (10.667) (10.363) (8.825)
Debt payments as a proportion of 
national income 
9.38E-14 1.74E-12 4.99E-12 -1.62E-13
 0.021 0.378 1.124 -0.0350
Industry value added as proportion 
of GDP 
(-0.001) (-0.003) (-0.002) (-0.002)
 (-0.249) (-0.920) (-0.645) (-0.599)
Index of regulatory governance 0-4  
  
Electricity Law 0.180   
 (5.130)   
Autonomous regulator 0.100  
 (2.343)  
Licence funding of regulator 0.135 
 (3.419) 
Civil service pay scales non-
mandatory  
 -0.180
  (-4.010)
  
Estimation method 
Fixed 
effects
Fixed 
effects
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects
Adjusted R-squared 0.953 0.952 0.953 0.953
S.E. of regression 0.271 0.273 0.271 0.271
F-statistic 385.888 367.622 382.725 375.033
Durbin-Watson 0.165 0.156 0.161 0.162
No of observations 585 577 583 577
Note:  t statistics in parentheses     
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4.2.1.3  Variants on the Static Generation Capacity Model 
 
Table 7 reports the results of equations where we estimate the effects of including 
independent variables measuring the rule of law as well as equations including 
privatisation and competition variables.  The rule of law measure is the Kaufmann 
index for 1996.   
 
Table 7:  Static Models for Generation Capacity: Variants 2 
Dependent Variable = 
Log(Electricity Generation capacity 
per capita)     
 Rule of Law 
Privatisation 
and 
Competition 
1 
Privatisation 
and 
Competition 
2 
Explanatory variables 9 10 11 
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.685 0.783 0.863 
 (8.228) (10.457) (12.052) 
Debt payments as a proportion of 
national income 
1.55E-12  
 (0.351)  
Industry value added as proportion 
of GDP 
0.002  
 (0.534)  
Index of regulatory governance 0-4 0.040 0.059  
 (2.269) (3.399)  
Privatisation  x  Autonomous 
regulator dummy 
0.021 0.186 
 (0.268) (2.961) 
Competition  x  Autonomous 
regulator dummy 
(-0.146) -0.100 
 (-1.600) (-1.098) 
Age of regulator 0.021  
 (4.096)  
Kaufmann Rule of Law Index x 
Index of Regulatory Governance 
0.061  
 (1.902)  
Estimation method Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Adjusted R-squared 0.954 0.955 0.954 
S.E. of regression 0.267 0.266 0.269 
F-statistic 363.457 408.369 413.946 
Durbin-Watson 0.157 0.166 0.160 
No of observations 577 602 602 
Note:  t statistics in parentheses    
 
Both privatisation and competition are included as 0/1 dummies with the switch to 1 
ascribed to the years following enactment of the electricity law.  Privatisation is 
measured by a 50% or more private shareholding in one or more of generation, 
distribution and supply.  A competition dummy of 1 was given to countries classified 
as having more than 8 companies operating in the electricity industry.   
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The data for the construction of these dummies were taken from the Domah 2001 
survey and represent the privatisation and competition picture in 2001. However, the 
actual dummies were constructed by the authors.  Neither of these dummies is very 
satisfactory for our purposes although they represent the best that can be done with 
currently available data.  The privatisation dummy is deficient on dating and the 
competition dummy is a weak proxy as well as poor on dating.  Improving data on 
these variables beyond what is currently available for electricity (i.e. to provide 
information comparable to telecoms) should be a high priority.   
 
The main points of interest from Table 7 are: 
 
• Equation 9 is the best fitting equation including the Kaufmann governance 
measures.  The coefficient on the Kaufmann rule of law index is positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level when interacted with the 
regulatory index.  Coefficient estimates on rule of law never approached 
statistical significance when included directly nor was it consistently 
significant as an interacted variable in other equations.   
Coefficients on the Kaufmann corruption index were never statistically 
different from zero at the 10% level when include either directly or indirectly 
(i.e. as an interactive term).   
• The coefficient on our competition proxy variable was consistently negative 
but not significantly different from zero.  The coefficient on the privatisation 
variable was only significant at the 10% level or better when interacted with 
the regulatory dummy and the regulatory index was excluded, as in equation 
11.  For the reasons given above, the results on the privatisation and 
competition variables probably reflect the deficiencies in the measures as 
much as any genuine economic impact. 
The failure to find any statistically significant coefficients on these variables does not 
necessarily mean that the legal and socio-economic context is irrelevant nor that our 
equations imply a zero effect.  We strongly suspect that these variables (and similar 
others) are captured to a considerable extent in the estimated pattern of fixed effects40.    
 4.2.1.4  Simple Dynamic Models of Generation Capacity 
In Table 8 below, we report our estimates of some relatively simple dynamic models   
Equations 12 and 13 report the results of the model for per capita generation capacity, 
but adding a lagged dependent variable.  Equation 14 estimates a dynamic model 
similar to that in Pargal (2003) for private investment in generation capacity in 9 Latin 
American countries using data from the Calderon-Serven data set.  
 
The main features of Table 8 are: 
 
• The estimated long run coefficients on the regulatory variables in Equations 12 
and 13 are comparable to their equivalents in the static equations.  However, 
                                                 
40  We will explore this conjecture in subsequent estimation. 
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the coefficient on the regulatory index in Equation 12 is only statistically 
significant at the 10% level.   
• The implicit long-run coefficient on the regulatory governance index in 
Equation 12 is 6.1 per unit on the index, implying a long-run effect of 24% on 
per capita generation capacity for a maximum score on the index.  The implicit 
long-run effect in Equation 13 on per capita generation capacity from a 
regulatory agency with at least 3 years of existence is 26%. 
• The elasticity of per capita generation capacity wrt. real GDP is very close to 1 
in both Equations 12 and 13. 
• For private electricity generation investment, in Latin America 1980-98, the 
regulatory variables never approached significance in any of the equations 
estimated.  Equation 14 is a typical example.  The share of industry value 
added was, however, consistently positive and significant.   
Table 8:  Dynamic Models for Generation Capacity and Investment 
Dependent Variable 
 
Log(Electricity 
Generation 
capacity per 
capita)  
 
Log(Electricity 
Generation 
capacity per 
capita)   
Log(private 
investment in 
generation in 
9 Latin 
American 
countries) 
     
Explanatory variables 12 13  14 
Lagged dependent variable 0.885 0.879  0.540
 (66.186) (66.0940  (6.805)
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.119 0.121  1.805
 (4.558) (4.610)  (3.223)
Debt payments as a proportion of 
national income 
 2.05E-10
  (0.363)
Industry value added as proportion 
of GDP 
 0.078
  (3.454)
Index of regulatory governance 0-4 0.007  -0.075
 (1.835)  (-0.663)
Regulator aged 1-3 years  0.010  
 (0.893)  
Regulator aged over 3 years 0.032  
 (2.247)  
Age of regulator  -0.003
  (-0.036)
Public investment in electricity 
generation (log) 
 0.137
  (1.585)
Implied long run multiplier 1/(1-
lamda) 
8.732 8.249  
Estimation method Fixed effects Fixed effects  Fixed effects
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Adjusted R-squared 0.996 0.996  0.857
S.E. of regression 0.083 0.083  0.683
F-statistic 4366.527 4399.462  43.037
Durbin-Watson 1.850 1.834  1.911
No of observations 576 584  99
Note:  t statistics in parentheses     
 
 
4.2.1.5 Tests of the Generation Capacity Model for Spurious 
Correlation 
 
In all the main generation capacity equations reported above, the R2 statistics are high 
– around 0.95 in the static fixed effects models and over 0.99 in the dynamic model.  
This clearly raises questions as to whether the empirical results are dominated by the 
purely statistical relationship of one highly trended variable (per capita generation 
capacity) with another (real per capita GDP). 
 
In fact, as shown in the country graphs reproduced in Appendix 2, neither the per 
capita generation series nor the real per capita GDP series are dominated by an 
obvious trend and the capacity per unit of GDP graph shows considerable variation 
over time within and between countries.  However, the issue is also worth more 
formal investigation and we report some preliminary regression results in Table 9. 
 
Table 9:  Generation Capacity – Tests for Spurious Correlation 
Dependent Variable 
 
Log(Electricity 
Generation 
capacity per 
capita)   
 
Log(Electricity 
Generation 
capacity per 
capita)  
    
Explanatory variables 15  16 
  
Time Trend  0.017 -0.0001 
 (7.695) (-0.071) 
(Lagged Dependent Variable) t-1 0.821 
 (49.429) 
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.441 0.179 
 (5.683) (5.500) 
(Index of regulatory governance 1-
4) t-3
0.022 0.013 
 (1.803) (2.511) 
  
Estimation method 
Fixed Effects   Fixed Effects 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.977 0.996 
S.E. of regression 0.195 0.081 
F-statistic 741.539 4289.469 
Durbin-Watson 0.255 1.896 
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No of observations 529 529 
Note:  t statistics in parentheses    
    
 
 
Key features arising are:  
 
• The time trend is significant at the 1% level in Equation 15 but not in Equation 
17, where the estimated coefficient is both negative and very small in 
magnitude as well as having an extremely low t-value. The estimated trend 
coefficient in Equation 15 is relatively small at 1.7% per year.  
 
• The estimated coefficient of the regulatory dummy in equation 16 is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and the magnitude of the long-run 
coefficient is very similar in magnitude to its equation 12 counterpart.  
However, the magnitude of the estimated regulatory coefficient in 15 is about 
half the magnitude of its equation 2 counterpart and only significant at the 
10% level. 
 
(Note that lagging the regulatory variable by 3 years implies that all regulators 
established after 1997 will be excluded.) 
 
These results are not conclusive in resolving the econometric modelling concerns and 
there are clearly unresolved issues in terms of the appropriate dynamic structure.  We 
will explore these issues more fully in further work.  However, the results reported in 
Table 9 provide evidence that our results reflect underlying economic relationships 
and are not just time-dominated statistical artifacts. 
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4.2.2 Econometric Results for Models of Generating Capacity 
Utilisation and Technical Losses 
 
Table 10 presents some results relating to the impact of regulatory governance on 
efficiency.  For the reasons set out above, we deliberately estimated simple models.  
The results were reasonably positive for capacity utilisation in generation but we 
never found any positive or significant effect of any regulatory variable for 
transmission and distribution losses 
 
Table 10:  Utilisation and Technical Losses 
Dependent Variable 
Utilisation of 
generation 
capacity*  
Technical 
losses in 
transmission 
and 
distribution 
(%) 
    
Explanatory variables 17  18 
  
  
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.729 -0.841 
 (2.279) (-0.441) 
Index of regulatory governance 0-4 0.079 0.219 
 (2.330) (1.016) 
AR(1) 0.713 0.648 
 (23.365) (17.786) 
   
   
Estimation method 
FE + Prais –
Winsten 
FE + Prais –
Winsten 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.743 0.840 
S.E. of regression 0.449 2.697 
F-statistic 56.196 92.624 
Durbin-Watson 2.138 2.032 
No of observations 574 472 
Note:  t statistics in parentheses    
    
*Utilisation = generation/(capacityx24x365)    
 
The positive effect in the utilisation equation of the regulatory index (significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level) was found in some but not all other equations 
estimated.  In the equation reported, a 1 point increase in the regulatory index is 
associated with a 0.8% increase in utilisation so that utilisation with the maximum 
index score of 4 implies a 3.2% increase relative to countries with an index score of 
zero. 
 
Generation capacity utilisation rates also appear to be positively (and significantly) 
associated with higher GDP within and between countries. 
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5. Discussion of Results and Concluding Comments 
 
5.1 Discussion of Results  
 
The results of this study seem to provide a broadly consistent picture that the 
existence of a regulatory agency with good governance characteristics not only can in 
principle improve regulatory outcomes but actually does so in practice.  For 
electricity supply industries in 28 developing countries in the 1980-2001 period, we 
find that an index of regulatory governance is a consistently positive and statistically 
determinant of per capita generation.  Our results, using fixed effects estimation 
methods, are similar to those found in for telecoms in developing countries (e.g. 
Gutierrez, 2003). 
 
The main positive findings are that  
 
1) Averaging over developing country regulatory agencies, the estimated long-
run impact on per capita generation capacity of a maximum regulatory 
governance index score of 4 is of the order of 15-25% cet par. 
 
2) The estimated impact of regulation increases with experience – at least for the 
first 3-5 years or more.  The cet par impact on per capita generation capacity 
of a regulator (autonomous and/or Ministry) established at least 3 years is of 
the order of 25-35%. 
 
3) The effects on per generation capacity are robust not just to the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable but also to the inclusion of a time trend and 3-year 
lags on the regulatory variables.  
 
4) The effects of the enactment of (a) a regulatory law, (b) of having an 
autonomous regulator and (c) licence fee funding of the regulatory agency 
were each positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
5) There is some evidence that better regulatory governance is a statistically 
significant determinant of generation capacity utilisation (a good proxy for 
availability). 
 
6) There is some evidence, albeit weak, that the better the rule of law, the 
stronger the regulatory effect  
 
There are, however, some negative findings.  These include the following 
 
1) A limited investigation showed no significant, positive effect of any of our 
regulatory governance measures on private electricity generation investment in 
nine Latin American countries. 
 
2) There was no evidence of any significant, positive effect of any of our 
regulatory governance measures on transmission and distribution losses. 
 
3) There was no reliable evidence in this data set that competition or privatisation 
were significant determinants of generation capacity either individually or 
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when interacted with regulatory governance.  However, the data set we used 
was much stronger on regulatory variables than on competition and 
privatisation variables. 
 
On the whole, we were surprised at the strength and robustness of the positive results.  
The data set we used has a number of major weaknesses in spite of being the best 
currently available.  Among the main weaknesses of the data set are: 
 
 The absence of any data on regulatory practice, including government (and/or 
electricity company) malpractice towards supposedly independent regulatory 
agencies (e.g. high within-term turnover rates of regulatory office 
heads/commissioners). 
 
 The absence of any reliable cross-country data on ESI efficiency and 
productivity or on service quality and revenue collection 
 
 The limited time dimension to the regulatory data – and the extremely limited 
time dimension to data on privatisation and competition. 
 
 Potential omitted variable biases from the inability to test for the inclusion of 
many potentially significant variables. 
 
 The limited and possibly unrepresentative sample of countries. 
 
It is to be hoped that some of the major data weaknesses can be remedied e.g. by 
systematic data collection exercises of the sort that have been carried out for telecom 
reform. 
 
5.2 Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper we have presented evidence which suggests that good regulatory 
governance does have a positive and statistically significant effect on some electricity 
industry outcomes in developing countries – notably per capita generation capacity 
levels - but we have not examined why this is so.   
 
To examine why and how regulation operates to improve outcomes is not a task that 
obviously recommends itself to econometric analysis.  We suggest that, at least at this 
stage, it is better pursued by case studies with econometric work being concentrated 
on whether or not the results reported in this paper are confirmed in subsequent 
analysis e.g. with superior data, particularly on regulatory practice, privatisation and 
competition variables. 
 
Nevertheless, we are confident that the results reported here are entirely consistent 
with the literature on the role of institutions in economic growth.  The key point is that 
regulatory agencies with better governance are: 
 
• Less likely to make mistakes 
 
• More likely to correct mistakes speedily 
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• Less likely to repeat mistakes 
 
• More likely to develop procedures and methodologies that involve participants 
and develop good practice. 
 
All of these reduce uncertainties for commercially operating companies – particularly 
private and foreign companies.  This is especially important to sustain and encourage 
long-lived, sunk investments in highly capital-intensive industries at a reasonable cost 
of capital.  As such, regulatory agencies, which have and maintain good governance, 
provide an effective underpinning for the operation of contracts as well as sound 
regulation of monopoly elements.  
 
The utility service industries like electricity supply may be considered as a microcosm 
for considering the role of institutions in sustaining investment, efficiency and growth.  
But, in fact, they are a touchstone.  Given their role in supporting growth as well as 
their technical characteristics, electricity and similar industries are among those most 
in need of strong and effective regulatory frameworks.  Hence, we suggest that our 
positive results on the role of good governance support and enhance the lessons of 
similar studies for independent central banks and telecom reform as well as 
supporting the general arguments of North, Rodrik and others on the role of effective 
and evolving institutions for sustained growth.   
 
It remains to be seen whether the results reported in this paper survive in the light of 
further analysis and can be replicated with better data. 
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APPENDIX:  LIST OF COUNTRIES IN SAMPLE 
 
 
(i) Main sample 
 
Argentina         
Barbados 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Grenada 
India 
Indonesia 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Sudan 
Trinidad 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
 
 
(i) Latin American (Calderon-Serven Sample) 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Peru 
Venezuela 
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